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1 Introduction
In a seminal paper, Aumann and Myerson (1988) proposed a model of en-
dogenous cooperation structure formation. Cooperation structures represent
situations in which players have the possibility to cooperate, or communi-
cate, only with a subset of the population. An interesting feature of these
situations is that two players who are in cooperation may not be in coop-
eration with the same subset of players. Hence, these structures may be
represented by non-directed graphs. Aumann and Myerson proposed to use,
in an extensive-form game, the Myerson value (Myerson, 1977) to compute
players’ payoffs in cooperation structures. A major drawback of their ap-
proach is that the order of play has to bet set exogenously. Recently, Qin
(1996) reformulated Aumann and Myerson’s game as a normal-form game.
One of Qin’s results is that if the underlying TU-game is superadditive,
then the full cooperation structure (each player cooperates with all the oth-
er players) is stable in the sense that no player can profitably deviate by
severing some of her links.
In this note we characterize the class of TU-games that admit a stable
full cooperation structure, and show that it is much larger than the class of
superadditive games. Indeed, we show that the full cooperation structure
is stable if and only if the value of each player is individually rational and
the TU-game is superadditive for two-player coalitions only. In particular,
this implies that if, for some TU-game (N, v) and two players i and j, we
have v({i, j}) < v({i}) + v({j}), then the full cooperation structure is not
stable.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the framework.
In section 3 we define the game of endogenous formation of cooperation
structure, and state and prove our characterization result.
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2 Definitions
A transferable utility game (or a TU-game) is defined by a couple (N, v)
whereN = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players, and v is the characteristic function
that maps the power set of N to the set of real numbers (with the convention
that v(∅) ≡ 0). The number v(S) yields the worth of coalition S ∈ 2N . The
space of all TU-games with the set of players N is denoted by ΓN .
We assume that players are able to establish meaningful relationships
with a subset of players, and we call the set of all private relationships a
cooperation structure. A useful way to represent cooperation structures
is by a non-directed graph, whose vertices represent players and whose edges
represent the relationships that players have between each other.
We define a graph, g, as a set of links between players. We write i:j ∈ g
when i and j are linked in g. Two players i and j are indirectly linked in g if
there exists a sequence i1, . . . , ik in N , with k ≥ 3, such that i = i1, it−1:it
for all t = 2, . . . , k, and ik = j. The sequence i1, . . . , ik is called a path.
Two players are said to be connected if they are (indirectly) linked. A
coalition S is said to be connected if any pair of players i, j ∈ S is connected
by a path involving only players in S. We denote by GRN the set of all
graphs and by gN the complete graph, i.e. the graph in which each player
is linked with all other players,
gN = {i:j | i ∈ N , j ∈ N , i 6= j}, (1)
GRN = {g | g ⊆ gN}. (2)
For any graph g, g\{i:j} denotes the graph in which the link i:j has been
deleted, and g ∪{i:j} is the graph to which the link i:j has been added. We
denote the graph g restricted to the set of vertices S by g(S),
g(S) = {i:j | i, j ∈ S, i:j ∈ g}.
For any subset of players S, there is a unique partition of players that
groups together players connected by g(S). Such a partition is denoted
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by S/g. In other words, for any i ∈ S, the element of the partition S/g
containing i also contains all other players that are connected to i by g(S).
A formal definition of this partition is defined as follows,
S/g = {{i ∈ S | i and j are connected in S by g} | j ∈ S}.
3 The game
Qin’s (1996) model works as follows. Given a TU-game (N, v), we allow
players to choose who they want to cooperate, or communicate with. Hence,
each player can have private relationships only with a subset of the grand
coalition. More formally, we define a non-cooperative game
G (N,v)µ =< N, (Σi)i∈N , (hi)i∈N ) >,
where the TU-game (N, v) is called the underlying game of G (N,v)µ . As in
(N, v), the set of players is N and Σi is the strategy space of player i. A
strategy σi for player i is defined as a n-dimensional vector whose coordinates
are either 0 or 1. When σi(j) = 0 player i does not wish to form a link with
player j, while he would be glad to create such a link when σi(j) = 1. The
ith coordinate of σi is assumed to be equal to zero, σi(i) ≡ 0. In other
words, no player can make a link with herself. A link between players i and
j is formed only if both i and j wish to create it: σi(j) = σj(i) = 1. We
denote the n-tuple of strategies by σ = (σ1, . . . , σn). Each σ ∈ (Σi)i∈N gives
a unique cooperation structure g(σ),
g(σ) = {i:j | σi(j) = σj(i) = 1}.
For each cooperation structure g, players are rewarded using the Myerson
value of the game (N, v) on g, denoted by the n-dimensional vector µ(v, g).
The Myerson value is an allocation rule for TU-games with graphs. To
compute the Myerson value for some game (N, v) and some cooperation
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structure g, we first need to define a characteristic function embedded on
graphs,
∀ S ⊆ N, (v/g)(S) =
∑
T∈S/g
v(T ). (3)
The Myerson value is the unique allocation µ rule that satisfies the Com-
ponent Efficiency axiom,∑
i∈N
µi(v, g) =
∑
S∈N/g
v(N),
and the Fairness axiom,
µi(v, g)− µi(v, g\i:j) = µj(v, g)− µj(v, g\i:j), ∀ g ∈ GRN , ∀ i:j ∈ g.
Myerson proved that his value is closely related to the Shapley value.
Indeed, we have
µ(v, g) = ϕ(v/g), ∀ (N, v) ∈ ΓN , ∀ g ∈ GRN ,
where ϕ is the Shapley value. It is straightforward to see that for the full
cooperation structure, v/g = v, and hence µ(v, gN ) = ϕ(v). Clearly, if some
player i is not connected to anyone in the cooperation structure g, then
µi(v, g) = v({i}). Note that it may happen that for some game (N, v) and
some g, we have µi(v, g) < v({i}).
Thus, the utility of a player in the game G (N,v)µ under the strategy profile
σ is her Myerson value of the corresponding cooperation structure,
hi(σ) ≡ µi(v, g(σ)). (4)
Consider now a cooperation structure g such that players i and j are not
linked, i.e., i:j /∈ g. Then, player i desires to link up with player j if and
only if
µi(v, g ∪ {i:j}) ≥ µi(v, g). (5)
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Given that the Myerson value satisfies the Fairness axiom, it is readily ver-
ified that if (5) holds true for player i, then it also holds true for player j.1
A cooperation structure g is stable in Qin’s sense if there is a strategy
profiles σ such that g(σ) = g and σ is a Nash equilibria of the game G (N,v)µ .
This result was also obtained in a similar framework by Dutta, van den
Nouweland, and Tijs (1998).2 We show now that this result can be extended
to a larger class of games.
Proposition 1 Let (N, v) be a TU-game and µ the Myerson value. Then
the full cooperation structure is stable if and only if µi(v, gN ) ≥ v({i}) for
all i ∈ N , and
v({i, j}) ≥ v({i}) + v({j}), for all i, j ∈ N. (6)
Proposition 1 says that if the Shapley value of each player in the game
(N, v) is individually rational then gN is stable if and only if the game (N, v)
is “superadditive” for two-player coalitions. Hence, the two conditions —
individual rationality and (6) — fully characterize the class of TU-games
that ensure the stability of the full cooperation structure.
As the following example shows, superadditivity of the game (N, v) is
not necessary for the stability of the full cooperation structure.
Example 1 Consider the following TU game (N, v) with N = {a, b, c, d},
1Reciprocity may not hold if player i wants to link up with several players at a time.
2Dutta, van den Nouweland, and Tijs (1998) employed several equilibrium concepts,
(undominated Nash equilibrium, coalition-proof Nash equilibrium and Strong Nash equi-
librium) and did not use a specific solution concept to analyse to equilibria of the game.
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and v defined by
v(S) =

0 if |S| = 1,
20 if |S| = 2,
12 if |S| = 3,
16 if |S| = 4.
The Myerson value of each player for the full cooperation structure is
µi(v, gN ) = 4, for i = a, b, c, d, which is individually rational. Obviously,
condition (6) is satisfied. Hence, Proposition 1 implies that the full coopera-
tion structure is stable. Yet, it is obvious that the full cooperation structure
is Pareto dominated, i.e. there is another cooperation structure (for instance
g′ = {a:b, c:d}) that yields a strictly higher value to all players.3
In order to prove the proposition, we introduce more definitions.
For any cooperation structure g and players i and j such that i:j ∈ g,
define the set
S(g, i:j) = {S ⊆ N | S/g = S and S/(g\{i:j}) 6= S}.
In other words, S(g, i:j) is the set of coalitions S such that S is connected in
g(S) but is non-connected in g(S)\{i:j}. When no confusion is possible, we
write S(i:j) instead of S(g, i:j). In other words, S(i:j) represents the set of
coalitions S that are connected thanks to i:j when the graph is restricted to
S.4 Thus, for any S ∈ S(i:j), if i:j is deleted, S/(g\{i:j} = {Si, Sj}), with
Si and Sj being the sets in S/(g\{i:j}) that contain i and j respectively.
Proof of Proposition 1 Observe that there is a unique strategy profile
σ∗ such that g(σ∗) = gN . Hence, σ∗ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
3A similar result was obtained by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), who showed that
some games G (N,v)µ may have a stable cooperation structures that are not efficient, i.e.
structures that do not maximize the worth of coalition(s).
4In graph terminology, we say that S(g, i:j) is the set of all subgraphs gˆ of g such that
the link i:j is critical in gˆ — see Bolloba´s (1998).
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no player breaks one or more links. Hence, it suffices to compare, for any
player i, her payoffs under the strategy profile σ and under the strategy
profile (σ′i, σ
∗
−i), where σ
′
i(j) = 0 for at least one j ∈ N\{i}.
Clearly, if the value of some player is not individually rational, then that
player has an incentive to break up all her links (or any part thereof), and
then the full cooperation structure is not stable. In other words, individual
rationality is a necessary condition for the full cooperation structure to be
stable. We now show that if the value of each player is individual rational,
then stability is equivalent to condition (6).
We claim that for any graph g, if a player contemplates breaking a link,
yielding g′, the change of her payoff (i.e., her Myerson value) will only depend
on the worth of the coalitions that are connected in g and not connected in
g′. To see this, consider the value of player i for a cooperation structure g
and g\{i:j}.
µi(v, g) =
∑
S3i
ρS ((v/g)(S)− (v/g)(S\i))
µi(v, g\{i:j}) =
∑
S3i
ρS ((v/g\{i:j})(S)− (v/g\{i:j})(S\i)) ,
where ρS =
(n−1)!(n−s)!
n! . Notice that
(i) g/(S\{i}) = (g\{i:j})(S\{i}),
(ii) (g\{i:j})/S 6= g/S when i:j connects S in g, i.e., when S ∈ S(i:j),
(iii) (g\{i:j})/S = g/S when i:j does not connects S in g.
Using (3) we deduce
(a) (i) ⇒ (v/g)(S\{i}) = (v/g\{i:j})(S\{i}), ∀S 3 i,
(b) (ii) ⇒ (v/g\{i:j})(S) 6= (v/g)(S) when S ∈ S(i:j),
(c) (iii) ⇒ (v/g\{i:j})(S) = (v/g)(S) when S /∈ S(i:j),
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Thus,
µi(g)− µi(g\{i:j}) ≥ 0
⇔
∑
S∈S(i:j)
ρS(v(S)− v(Si)− v(Sj)) ≥ 0, (7)
which proves the claim. Observe that if g = gN , then S(i:j) = {{i, j}}. In
other words, in the full cooperation structure, if a player i breaks a link with
player j, the only coalition that becomes non-connected is {i, j}.
More generally, suppose that some player i severs her links in gN with
players j ∈ S, where S is some subset ofN\{i}. Then we have {S(i:j)}j∈N =
{{i, j}j∈S}. This implies that i severs her links with players j ∈ S ⊆ N\{i}
if, and only if ∑
j∈S
ρ{ij}(v({ij})− v({i})− v({j})) < 0. (8)
As (8) holds for any S ⊆ N\{i}, for any i ∈ N , the result follows. 
Qin (1996) showed that if the underlying TU-game is superadditive,
then for any partition P of N , there is a Nash equilibrium σ game such
that N/g(σ) = P — see Qin (1996, remark 2). We now show that this
result can be extended.5
Proposition 2 Let (N, v) be a superadditive TU-game. For any g ⊆ gN ,
there exist a strategy profile σ such that g = (σ) = g and σ is a Nash
equilibrium of G (N,v)µ .
Proof Consider any superadditive game (N, v) and any cooperation struc-
ture g. Hence, (7) always holds and we can deduce that no player wishes to
break a link. Consider the following strategy profile. For each player i ∈ N ,
let σi(j) = 0 if i:j /∈ g and σ∗i (j) = 1 if i:j ∈ g. Because players do not sever
links, if a player i deviates with the strategy σˆ, it should be the case that
5See Dutta, van den Nouweland, and Tijs (1998, proposition 1) for a similar result.
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for some j we have σˆi(j) = 1 and σ∗i (j) = 0. But deviations are individuals,
which implies that σ∗j (i) = 0. Hence, g(σˆi, σ
∗
−i) = g, and player’s i payoff
remains unchanged. Thus, i has no incentives to deviates. 
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